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Ask Not For Whom the Law School Bell Tolls: 
Professor Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools, and 
(Mis)Diagnosing the Problem 
Michael A. Olivas  
It is a truth universally acknowledged that law faculty are in want 
of purpose. It takes a lot to get us riled, and even more to call us to 
the barricades. But the current state of financing legal education is 
just such a burning theater, and we all should be troubled by the fast-
churning events. Because most of us went to law school during the 
Golden Age, which I situate as having ended in approximately 2005–
06, at the top of the application apex and the height of the modern-
day job markets for law graduates, most of us are blissfully unaware 
of recent developments that literally threaten the enterprise. I write to 
discuss these many moving parts and to call us to action as a 
community, for threats to the universe of legal education will affect 
us all to our collective detriment and to that of our students. The real 
Cassandra, however, is Professor Brian Z. Tamanaha, whose 
apocalyptic book Failing Law Schools
1
 is a shrill call to arms, a 
substantial work of powerful charges and dire solutions, well-written 
and arriving at a crucial time in legal education, in the United States 
and worldwide. I believe he holds powerful diagnostic skills and has 
 
  Michael A. Olivas is William B. Bates Distinguished Chair in Law and Director, 
Institute for Higher Education Law & Governance, University of Houston Law Center. He 
served as the President of the Association of American Law Schools in 2011. 
 This Article grew out of a shorter AALS presidential column. I acknowledge my 
substantial debt to Dean Richard Matasar for his scholarship and service in this important area 
and to Dean Kent D. Syverud for his service and for his invitation to present this paper at his 
law school. I also thank Lauren E. Schroeder, Katy Stein, and Professors Linda Jellum, Peter 
Winograd, and Phil Schrag for their useful suggestions on various editions, and note the work 
of my two official food-tasters (Dean Larry Dessem and Professor Robert Gorman) for their 
efforts in reviewing all my AALS columns. Of course, we all disagree on many of these issues, 
but their views have substantially affected my attention to the subject. All views expressed in 
this Article are my own, and should not be considered AALS policy.  
 1. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).  
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a storyteller’s narrative, but I believe his solutions are substantially 
wide of the mark, and would violate the code that remedial actions 
should, at the least, do no harm. If he were simply overstating issues 
or being a provocateur for the sheer sake of being one, as other critics 
have done,
2
 I would simply let him stew in his own juices. But his 
devastating critique has a number of accurate observations, ones I 
share, so laying out his arguments and his critical architecture is 
necessary to see how the analytic second step—his remedies—can be 
so wrong. Indeed, rather than merely noting his architectural 
framework, I will note the arithmetic of his remedies, and attempt to 
show why he should receive only partial credit for his math 
homework. 
THE MANY MOVING PARTS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY  
OF LEGAL EDUCATION  
First, I set out the many moving parts, and briefly describe their 
interrelationships. I will then contrast Professor Tamanaha’s 
assessment with my own and that of Dean Richard Matasar, another 
critic of legal education, who is addressed in the book, but in 
glancing fashion (and in a somewhat snarky manner, as with noting 
the dean’s large salary for the record). Indeed, I note from the outset 
that Failing Law Schools cites a substantial number of studies in his 
extensive footnotes, but he never offers a critical or synthetic review 
of the research literatures, including a number of which might have 
made more explicit his argumentation or buttressed his points, even 
better than did his own arithmetic. He also uses a number of straw 
man arguments, and does not discern carefully his critics from his 
supporters. Therefore, his book has a breathless, repetitive, and 
broad-brush quality to it, rendering it much less effective than it 
might have been. 
 
 2. A number of critical bloggers fit this bill, but I give a shout-out here to Professor Paul 
Campos, who has turned snarkiness into anonymous work (“ScamProf”), later acknowledged as 
his own, in his blog INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM and in a self-published e-book, DON’T GO 
TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS): A LAW PROFESSOR’S INSIDE GUIDE TO MAXIMIZING 
OPPORTUNITY AND MINIMIZING RISK (2012). I note that I am eternally grateful for his work on 
reducing prejudice against overweight persons, THE OBESITY MYTH (2004), even if it appeared 
too late to help me. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/6
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Here, then, I list many of my own assumptions about legal 
education, many of which I readily note are congruent with the 
trenchant observations of Professor Tamanaha. Neither of us are the 
first cowboys at this particular rodeo, so there is a surprisingly large 
body of research in legal education, most, but not all of it by legal 
scholars. And there is a remarkable convergence on what the major 
issues and problems are. A number of states, faced with ruinous 
economic conditions, are reducing their subsidy to public collegiate 
institutions.
3
 This development and the rising cost of private 
education have meant that it is harder to finance education without 
resorting to substantial student debt burdens.
4 
Many students already 
arrive at law schools with substantial obligations and compromised 
credit worthiness.
5
 Some states have privatized their public law 
schools, rapidly increasing the tuition prices.
6
 Private law school 
 
 3. There is an extensive literature on this distressing feature. Among the better resources 
is Donald E. Heller, State Support for Higher Education: Past, Present, and Future, in 
PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 11, 17–18 (Douglas M. Priest & Edward P. St. John 
eds., 2006) (noting decline of state support subsidies for colleges from approximately 50 
percent of institutional totals in 1980 to 35 percent in 2000). See also Michael S. McPherson & 
Morton O. Schapiro, U.S. Higher Education Finance, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
EDUCATION 1403, 1403–34 (Eric Alan Hanushek & Finis Welch eds., 2006). 
 4. See Lani Guinier, Guardians at the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 113, 130 n.67 (2003) (discussing college student debt). The number of case studies has 
also increased, leading to very distressing reading of individual students and families. See, e.g., 
Ron Lieber, For Student Borrowers, Relief Now May Mean a Big Tax Bill Later, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 2012, at B1; Jason DeParle, For Poor, Leap to College Often Ends in a Hard Fall, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2012, at A1; Caitlin Peterkin, Rising Student-Loan Debt Spurs Calls for 
Frank Discussion, Not Panic Over Extreme Cases, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 26, 2012, at 
A3. 
 5. The College Board tracks these trends over time, and the data reveal clearly that an 
increasing number of students borrow for their undergraduate education, and borrow more 
money, even adjusted for inflation. COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2011 at 4, 19, 
Figure 10A and 10B, available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/Student_Aid_ 
2011.pdf. In addition, a growing legal and economic literature is available, analyzing these 
issues. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Risk Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 
(2013). 
 6. As examples, see the websites at various high-ranking public law schools, such as 
those in the University of California system, where in 2012–13, the tuition and fees alone at UC 
Berkeley and UCLA were $50,373.50 (http://www.law.berkeley.edu/6943.htm) and $47,464 
(https://www.law.ucla.edu/current-students/tuition-and-fees/Pages/default.aspx) respectively, 
for residents. Out-of-state-students will pay additional non-resident charges. But as difficult as 
it is to accept this development, these schools are behaving rationally in a market where their 
state funds have declined, where the stock market is affecting their endowments, and where 
their applications and market niches remain competitive. Legal scholar Bryant Garth applies 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 41:101 
 
 
tuition costs have continued to outstrip the consumer price index.
7
 
Both these features have meant that law student debt loads have also 
increased substantially. Professor Tamanaha is at his best in 
chronicling these developments, carefully laying out the way that 
debt issues arose, and giving examples of the extraordinary costs 
being incurred by the increased costs of legal educations, ones that 
have affected both ends of the spectrum, from the fabulously 
successful Yale Law School charging $50,750 in 2010 to the lowest-
tier John Marshall in Atlanta, which he characterizes as one whose 
students “graduated with an average law school debt of $123,025, 
among the highest in the country. Many graduates did not get jobs as 
 
this lesson, drawing upon the work of economist Caroline Hoxby, who has analyzed the 
undergraduate markets and competition for undergraduate students. CAROLINE M. HOXBY, 
NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 6323, HOW THE CHANGING MARKET STRUCTURE OF U.S. HIGHER 
EDUCATION EXPLAINS COLLEGE TUITION 5–7 (1997). Citing Hoxby, Garth notes: “Educational 
hierarchy is real in Hoxby’s analysis. Schools that are relatively unselective cannot invest as 
much, leading to more differentiation in the market. But the main point is that the large 
increases in tuition among less selective and more selective universities are in Hoxby’s analysis 
rational responses to increased competition.” Bryant Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and 
Competition in Legal Education: A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal 
Profession and Legal Education, STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2013), 33–34, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166441. He paraphrases Hoxby: 
From this perspective, the increase in law school tuition comes from a more 
competitive market. As with respect to undergraduates, potential students now have 
much more information about the relative quality and prestige of different law schools. 
The brightest students are less likely to attend the local alternative or state school in 
lieu of a more elite school than in the past, and the availability of inexpensive travel 
facilitates attendance away from home. 
 Hoxby argues that the strategy of cutting tuition does not work as a means of 
attracting high quality students; instead, it leads to a self-fulfilling decline in student 
quality. Law schools according to this logic raise tuition to offer inducements to 
students such as clinics, writing programs, academic support, journals, and enhanced 
career services. She does not dwell on this point, but the students also may be 
shopping for notable professors in programs that interest them. Students considering 
law schools that appear comparable in some respects shop, according to this argument, 
according to what they believe will help them get more out of their investment in law 
school. Schools that are relatively unselective cannot invest as much, leading to more 
differentiation in the market, but they compete as long as the[y] can and as effectively 
as they can, including with tuition increases if they can be sustained. 
Id. at 34 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
 7. Garth, supra note 6. See also Matt Leichter, At Last, a Rational Explanation for Why 
Law School Tuition Keeps Rising, AMLAWDAILY (Mar. 1, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://amlawdaily 
.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/03/at-last-a-rational-explanation-for-why-law-school-tuition-
keeps-rising.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/6
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lawyers. Whether accredited or unaccredited, the school remains at 
the bottom of the Atlanta-area law school hierarchy and its students 
will have limited opportunities for employment.”8  
And he lays this dire assessment at the feet of the requisite ABA 
accreditation process, whose opaque and collusive governance 
enables legal educators to coerce all law schools into meeting higher 
(and more expensive) standards: “Now, however, students must pay a 
premium that attaches to accreditation, not just because it costs more 
to run an accredited law school but also because the market-based 
tuition price of an accredited law school is at least $10,000 higher 
than an unaccredited school.”9 He also plays off other schools against 
each other, as in the case of UCLA and Loyola Marymount in Los 
Angeles, where he contrasts the variegated opportunity structures at 
these competing institutions.
10
 Even while thoroughly noting and 
critiquing these contrasting differences in law schools, at the same 
time, he develops a major premise that the accreditation process 
flattens them and requires a cookie-cutter accreditation regime, one 
that is too costly and borne largely by students: proposals to loosen 
some of the important ABA standards “would allow…greater 
flexibility and variation among law schools.”11 If there is a single 
point at which his logic fails, one need look no further than these 
mutually-exclusive assertions about the variability of the two hundred 
or so U.S. (ABA-accredited or provisionally-accredited) law schools 
and the accreditation provisions that have enabled so many styles and 
approaches to flower and bloom, looking nothing at all alike.
12
 These 
 
 8. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 19. 
 9. Id. at 19. 
 10. Id. at 101. 
 11. Id. at 31. 
 12. When he does cite relevant literature, he does so selectively and incompletely, as 
when he notes a single sentence from a recent Government Accountability Office report, 
“Higher Education: Issues Related to Law School Cost and Access,” that he correctly reports 
attributes rising costs to “competition over the ranking” TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 78. 
However, he omits the larger and more extensive findings, directly on point, that attribute 
accreditation requirements a “minor role” in the costs. “According to law school officials, the 
move to a more hands-on, resource-intensive approach to legal education and competition 
among schools for higher rankings appear to be the main factors driving the cost of law school, 
while ABA accreditation requirements appear to play a minor role. Additionally, officials at 
public law schools reported that recent decreases in state funding are a contributor to rising 
tuition at public schools. Most law school officials do not cite ABA accreditation standards as 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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developments have also led to internal reorganizations and the 
creation of revenue streams to law schools, such as increased CLE 
and short-term curricular offerings, executive-style programs 
especially at the graduate level, additional and more-specialized LLM 
programs (including on-line and asynchronous course offerings), and 
many other revenue-generating and auxiliary enterprises, all of which 
have further diversified the universe of law schools. These many 
different response choices (some are market-driven, others are 
devices “for harvesting additional bodies”) and other features have 
also led to regular fluctuations in enrollment patterns, expanding and 
contracting accordion-like, as conditions permit.
13
  
Professor Tamanaha does provide a useful service in his 
substantive analysis of enrollment and application data, perhaps the 
most detailed and balanced exposition of any single issue in this 
complex book. But it is what he chooses not to discuss that is equally 
telling, particularly the need for law students to live more frugal lives 
while in law school, so that they do not live like law students when 
they are lawyers, bar passage rates, and in my view, the most salient 
counter to his narrative—compared to what?  
Asking this last question situates the data in historical and 
comparative fashion, including earlier similar times in the ebbs and 
flows of legal education.
14
 In a difficult post-baccalaureate job 
 
having an impact on minority access at their schools.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-10-20, HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES RELATED TO LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS 2 
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1020.pdf. He also refers to the GAO as the 
Government Accounting Office. 
 13. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 64. 
 14. See Michael A. Olivas, Paying for a Law Degree: Trends in Student Borrowing and 
the Ability to Repay Debt, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 333 (1999). For a more recent study, see David 
Barnhizer, Redesigning the American Law School, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249 (2010). See 
generally NAT’L SCI. BD., DIMINISHING FUNDING AND RISING EXPECTATIONS: TRENDS AND 
CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES (2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/ 
nsb/publications/2012/nsb1245.pdf; Stacey Patton, Applications to U.S. Graduate Schools 
Increase, but New Enrollments Drop, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 28, 2012), http://chronicle 
.com/article/Applications-to-US-Graduate/134746/; Tamar Lewin, College Loans Weigh 
Heavier On Graduates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at A1 (two-thirds of all bachelor’s degree 
recipients graduated with debt in 2008; in 1993, it was fewer than 50 percent. In 2010, college 
graduates who took out loans averaged $24,000 in debt.). But see Ann Carrns, College Students 
Don’t See Debt as Burden, N.Y. TIMES BUCKS BLOG (June 15, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://bucks 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/college-students-surprising-attitude-toward-debt/?nl=your-money 
&emc=your-moneyema5 (suggesting the opposite, that students were not burdened with debt). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/6
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market, law schools historically have been reasonable and accessible 
options to medical school, MBA programs, and other graduate or 
professional alternatives for college graduates. While there are more 
law students enrolled at present than in history, the demographics of 
law study are shifting as well, and not all populations will be equally 
able to undertake law study. While I think we should watch these 
figures carefully, I do not agree that we should believe or act as if the 
sky is falling.   
 
There is a growing consensus that the legal education system is overbuilt and overleveraged, by 
any reasonable estimates, but there is less consensus on what the solutions are. See, e.g., 
William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: Federal Loans Inflate 
College Budgets, But How Long Will That Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay Their Bills?, A.B.A. J., 
Jan. 2012, at 30; ERIN DILLON, EDUCATION SECTOR, AFFORDABLE AT LAST: A NEW STUDENT 
LOAN SYSTEM (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.educationsector.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications/AffordableAtLast_RELEASE.pdf. 
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Every institution has its own admissions trajectory and narrative, 
and there have been years where schools defied gravity, and there 
will be years where they return to earth. In addition, these national 
aggregate data are very volatile and cyclic. Schools did fine and no 
one couched the scoring in apocalyptic terms back in 1987–88 or 
1994–2001, when there were fewer LSAT takers than there were in 
2011–12 (130,000). There are many interlocking features to these 
issues, including the strength of the post-baccalaureate job market, 
perceptions about overall degree value and professional 
opportunities, international test-taking and immigration trends, and 
other features over which the legal education industrial complex has 
little or no control. In volatile times, some schools lean into the wind 
and increase their size, as did Cooley, while others downsize, as did a 
number of institutions.
15
 Cruel fates await schools that guess wrong, 
in either direction, but I read these institutional responses as major 
differentiating features, not the evidence of convergence that 
Professor Tamanaha observes. And the test itself is re-normed 
periodically to account for the psychometrics of the testing 
population, so that a given score one year may be slightly different 
than the same raw score and percentile in a different year.
16 
And, most importantly, these developments are always relative—
compared to what? Post-baccalaureate professional students in the 
United States and the world form the talent pool, and while they are 
not interchangeable with each other, they are the likely overall 
admissions pool. This pool is growing and law schools will always 
fare well in this competition, especially when U.S. graduate students 
are declining as a part of that whole, when it is more expensive to 
become a medical doctor and establish a medical practice, and when 
 
 15. Thomas Cooley, headquartered in Lansing, Michigan, is among the few ABA-
accredited law schools with approved law programs in non-contiguous states. See Elie Mystal, 
Ranking The Worst ABA-Accredited Law Schools, ABOVETHELAW (Oct. 31, 2012, 12:03 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2012/10/ranking-the-worst-aba-accredited-law-schools/#more-202939. 
 16. Linda F. Wightman, Consequences of Race-Blindness: Revisiting Prediction Models 
with Current Law School Data, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229 (2003). In this study, psychometrician 
Wightman reviewed a number of testing methodology and efficacy issues, particularly 
differentiated racial results of LSAT test taking. In a different vein, Wim J. van der Linden has 
studied technical and administrative issues in differential testing times. LAW SCHOOL 
ADMISSION COUNCIL, RESEARCH REPORT 08-01, CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN RESPONSE-TIME 
MODELING (2008), available at http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/research/rr/pdf/rr-08-01.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 41:101 
 
 
corporations are subsidizing fewer MBA enrollees among their 
employees. The worldwide economic restructuring across 
professional sectors has affected these fields and others such as 
pharmacy/allied health professions/dentistry/public administration 
and the other possible alternatives for college graduates. As a result, 
trends for medical school test-takers and applicants also vary, as do 
those in MBA programs and graduate programs generally. A 
September 2012 Wall Street Journal article about MBA applications 
could have as easily been about law schools, when it summarized the 
precipitous decline in MBA test-taking and MBA applications 
nationwide: “Demand for an M.B.A. has cooled in recent years. But 
this year, it’s downright frigid in some corners of the market.”17 No 
matter how the cycle turns, there will always be competition for and 
among potential law students, and this will occur whether or not law 
school tuitions increase. And there are only so many choices from 
which pre-professional students can choose. Law schools will survive 
and even flourish, and if some do not, in a Darwinian environment, 
these forces will still apply.
18 
 
 17. See generally Melissa Korn, M.B.A.s Lose Their Luster at Some Schools, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 10, 2012, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2012/09/10/m-b-a-s-lose-their-luster-
at-some-schools/. For application and admissions trend data across several areas of study, see 
ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., MCAT SCORES AND GPAS FOR APPLICANTS AND MATRICULANTS 
TO U.S. MEDICAL SCHOOLS, 2000–2011 (2011), available at https://www.aamc.org/download/ 
161690/data/table17.pdf (medical); GRADUATE MGMT. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, KEY TRENDS IN 
THE GMAT STUDENT PIPELINE, 2012, available at http://www.gmac.com/~/media/Files/gmac/ 
Research/miscellaneous/gmac-presentations-at-icam2012-public-final1.pdf (MBA programs); 
Heather Biele, Majority of Veterinary Colleges See Rise in Graduate Numbers in 2012: Iowa 
State, Ohio State Continue to Top List by Class Size, DVM NEWSMAGAZINE, July 1, 2012, at 
35, available at http://veterinarynews.dvm360.com/dvm/Veterinary+news/Majority-of-veterina 
ry-colleges-see-rise-in-gradua/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/778718?contextCategoryId=44924 
(veterinary medicine); and graduate programs generally: COUNCIL OF GRADUATE SCH., 
GRADUATE ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES 2000–2010, at ch. 3 (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.cgsnet.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/R_ED2010.pdf; NAT’L SCI. BD., DIMINISHING 
FUNDING AND RISING EXPECTATIONS: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC RESEARCH 
UNIVERSITIES (2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2012/nsb1245.pdf.  
 18. If a law school were to close or suspend its operations, it will likely be a marginal 
freestanding for-profit (or low-prestige collegiate) institution in a geographical area with a full 
array of other competing collegiate institutions with law programs, or a California private 
school at a low-prestige institution, where the school loses ABA accreditation or provisional 
accreditation, and where bar authorities move to limit the ability of its students to sit for the 
state bar examination. Each year, dozens of undergraduate colleges close, merge, or reconstitute 
themselves. See, e.g., GARY RHOADES, CENTER FOR HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY REPORT NO. 
1, CLOSING THE DOOR, INCREASING THE GAP: WHO’S NOT GOING TO (COMMUNITY) COLLEGE? 
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In addition, Professor Tamanaha paints a dismal picture about the 
debt loads being forced onto law students to pay for the upscale law 
schools, chasing prestige and enrollments, and he makes indirect 
references to the cost of living and forgone wages issues that round 
out the cost of legal education, such as noting that the cost of law 
school attendance in New Haven, Connecticut was $19,700 in 2010. 
Of course, he and many others have considered this trend.
19
 But he is 
silent on how many law students live beyond their means while in 
law school, by failing to economize and to live more modestly and 
frugally than is often the case. Any frank appraisal of professional 
school costs would have to include accurate and useful information 
on this feature. 
And he is noticeably silent on how bar passage rates align students 
along a continuum, and the natural experiment that occurs in 
California each year, an odd omission, inasmuch as a number of his 
more telling anecdotes and case studies originate in California. There, 
76 percent of the graduates of the California ABA-accredited schools 
in 2011 who took the State bar passed the July exam, while only 35 
percent of the non-ABA approved school graduates (that is, the state-
accredited schools) passed the same bar examination. Graduates from 
both types of law schools can sit for the bar and practice in California 
after passing the examination, but the differentiated results and 
pattern have repeated themselves over many years of the parallel 
tracks, indicating how the unaccredited institutions have regressed to 
a much lower mean, traditionally at half the success rate.
20
 Despite 
his earnest solicitousness for the students, this glaring disparity 
reveals what the national universe would look like, absent the ABA 
and its essential accreditation role in assuring a level of quality and 
efficacy in accredited schools. If anyone is getting short shrift in legal 
education or being victimized by their law schools, it is the graduates 
of these state-accredited schools, whose debt loads may be somewhat 
lower due to the cheaper model he urges, but whose legal educations 
 
(2012), available at http://futureofhighered.org/uploads/ClosingTheDoorFINAL_ALL32812 
.pdf. 
 19. There is a free and useful interactive computer program, the Law School Cost 
Calculator, available at http://www.admissionsdean.com/paying_for_law_school/law-school-
cost-calculator. Warning: Users should be prepared for the sticker shock phenomenon. 
 20. See infra Figure 2: California Bar Passage Rates. 
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are demonstrably of lower quality and whose job prospects are 
severely compromised, as is their likelihood that they will ever 
become lawyers. He is dismissive of discussions about these 
consequences, even as he urges such schools be allowed to operate: 
“Talk of a race to the bottom is scare mongering.”21 Students have 
more and more transparent information about their choices, but there 
are substantial information asymmetries, ones that can lead to 
imperfect self-assessments. As with choices of annuities, 401(k) 
plans, and prepaid tuition plans, there are so many choices that 
applicants are in a position to have too much data, and a poor sense 
of what law school is the best for them, even which sector is better in 
California.
22
 
FIGURE 2: CALIFORNIA BAR PASSAGE RATES, ABA-ACCREDITED 
AND STATE APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS
23
 
GENERAL BAR EXAMINATION STATISTICS (FEBRUARY 2012) 
Law School Type 
First-Timers  Repeaters  All Takers 
Took Pass %Pass  Took Pass %Pass  Took Pass %Pass 
CA ABA Approved 478 297 62.1  1245 621 49.9  1723 918 53.3 
Out-of-State ABA 284 135 47.5  530 206 38.9  814 341 41.9 
CA Accredited 105 35 33.3  433 106 24.5  538 141 26.2 
CA Unaccredited 91 30 33.0  272 38 14.0  363 68 18.7 
Law Office/Judges’ 
Chambers 
1 1 100.0  1 0 0.0  2 1 50.0 
Foreign Educated/JD 
Equivalent + One Year 
US Education 
42 7 16.7  44 7 15.9  86 14 16.3 
US Attorneys Taking the 
General Bar Exam 
333 230 69.1  155 58 37.4  488 288 59.0 
Foreign Attorneys Taking 
the General Bar Exam 
101 26 25.7  177 45 25.4  278 71 25.5 
4-Year Qualification 10 3 30.0  27 2 7.4  37 5 13.5 
Schools No Longer in 
Operation 
1 0 0.0  52 2 3.8  53 2 3.8 
Total 1446 764 52.8  2936 1085 37.0  4382 1849 42.2 
 
 21. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 31. 
 22. As one example of a call to simplify, see Libby Nelson, White House Urges States to 
Make College-Savings Plans More Usable, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 9, 2009), http://chron 
icle.com/article/White-House-Urges-States-to/48345. 
 23. California Bar Examination Statistics, STATE BAR OF CAL. (Feb. 2012), http://admis 
sions.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/4/documents/Statistics/FEBRUARY2012STATS.pdf (last visited Feb. 
16, 2013).  
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Moreover, federal law requires all its accrediting agencies, such as 
the ABA, to articulate clear standards and reasonable criteria, and to 
revise them regularly in the certification process. Therefore, the ABA 
Council on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar serves as the 
quality control mechanism for the financial aid eligibility that 
underpins federal government loan programs. Up until approximately 
2010, many law students were in a position to finance the cost of 
their college and professional education with subsidized loans, which 
they repaid from employment in a well-paid profession, where career 
earnings improved over the trajectory of lawyers’ careers. All the 
parts of this equation are shifting, and the equation itself is unlikely 
to continue as a working model for many of our students, as he 
accurately documents.
24 
Without the complex regime of relatively 
inexpensive and subsidized student loans, many students could not 
assume the growing risks of undertaking law study, at least not in the 
traditional three-year format of fulltime enrollment.
25
 Not all enrolled 
students or their families will be able to avail themselves of stricter 
lending requirements. At the least, the costs of borrowing are likely 
to increase, postponing the debt repayment but also substantially 
increasing that burden. At the successful urging of legal educators, 
Congress adopted both an income-based repayment plan and a public 
interest loan forgiveness program, but law students have not used 
them as widely as they should be used. Here, Professor Philip Schrag 
has usefully rebutted Professor Tamanaha’s analysis of the various 
plans; they need revision, especially for the possible long-term tax 
consequences, but they provide a pathway to legal education that 
 
 24. For recent stories about undergraduate employment markets, see Catherine Rampell, 
Many With New College Degree Find the Job Market Humbling, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, at 
A1. Legal employment figures are regularly reported by NALP: Press Release, The Association 
of Legal Career Professionals (NALP), Class of 2010 Graduates Faced Worst Job Market Since 
Mid-1990s: Longstanding Employment Patterns Interrupted (June 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/11SelectedFindings.pdf. Federal data suggest that 
the growth in the legal job market will increase by 10 percent in the next decade, lower than the 
overall job market, which it predicts will be 14 percent. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: LAWYERS (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/ 
ooh/legal/lawyers.htm (“Job Outlook, 2010–20: The projected rate of change in employment for 
the 10-year timeframe between 2010 and 2020.”). 
 25. Frank Donoghue, The Gainful-Employment Rule—New Developments and 
Implications, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 20, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/innova 
tions/the-gainful-employment-rule-new-developments-and-implications/29690.  
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should be a serious consideration for many law students.
26
 
Limitations on bankruptcy for student loans likely mean that there 
will be pressure upon state bar authorities to use financial health and 
credit records in the moral character and fitness determination 
process.
27
 Some institutions, especially newly established and a 
number of other struggling law schools, may not be able to meet the 
increased regulatory requirements for administering loan programs, 
such as the proposed “gainful employment” and 90/10 criteria. While 
these are very technical matters, they mean that schools with 
 
26. See Brian Tamanaha, What’s Wrong with Income Based Repayment in Legal 
Academia: A Response to Schrag, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 29, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2012/11/whats-wrong-with-income-based-repayment.html; Libby A. Nelson, An Underused 
Lifeline, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 23, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/ 
news/2012/10/23/despite-student-debt-concern-income-based-repayment-lags. See also Jack 
Crittenden, A 45% Employment Rate? How Law School Employment Numbers are Inflated, 
NAT’L JURIST (June 15, 2011, 12:06PM), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/45-employ 
ment-rate-how-law-school-employment-numbers-are-inflated. See also Philip G. Schrag, The 
Federal Income-Contingent Repayment Option for Law Student Loans, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
733 (2001); he published a fuller version as a book: REPAY AS YOU EARN: THE FLAWED 
GOVERNMENT PROGRAM TO HELP STUDENTS HAVE PUBLIC SERVICE CAREERS (2001). More 
recent authoritative research on the subject by Professor Schrag includes: Philip G. Schrag, 
Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers and Other Employees 
of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27 (2007) and Philip G. 
Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, Coordinating Loan Repayment Assistance Programs with New 
Federal Legislation, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583–612 (2011). There is a growing literature in this 
area, and it will likely shed more light when some of the definitional and data issues are 
resolved. See, e.g., ASSOC. AM. U., LOOKING MORE CLOSELY AT STUDENT DEBT (Aug. 9, 
2012), available at http://www.aau.edu/search/default.aspx?searchtext=Looking%20More% 
20Closely%20at%20Student%20Debt. Simply increasing technical assistance and transparency, 
while necessary, does not automatically lead to better understanding or use of financial aid, 
especially loans. See, e.g., HEALEY C. WHITSETT & RORY O’SULLIVAN, NERA ECONOMIC 
CONSULTING, LOST WITHOUT A MAP: A SURVEY ABOUT STUDENTS’ EXPERIENCES 
NAVIGATING THE FINANCIAL AID PROCESS (2012), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-
files/PUB_Student_Loan_Borrowers_1012.pdf. In addition, Administration underwriting 
standards will likely cause many parents to be uncreditworthy or ineligible for loans that they 
would take out for their children. See Libby A. Nelson, Cracking Down on PLUS Loans, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Oct. 12, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/12/ 
standards-tightening-federal-plus-loans#ixzz296VwhEbi. 
 27. As two of literally hundreds of bar admissions cases that turn on financial 
responsibility, including bankruptcy issues, see Application of G. W., 161 N.H. 401, 13 A.3d 
194 (2011) (financial irresponsibility, fraud, and deceit in bar application); In re Griffin, 943 
N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio 2011) (concerning bankruptcy). For a thorough review of the bankruptcy 
hardship provisions affecting students, see Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real 
Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179 (2009); 
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405 (2005). 
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undercapitalized operating expenses (that is, they rely almost 
exclusively upon tuition) and poor placement and/or bar passage 
records for graduates will find it more difficult to operate and be 
authorized to administer federal loans.
28
 Under current structures, no 
law school in the United States could operate without access to 
federal borrowing and lending activities for its students. 
In perhaps the most ominous sign of change, the law firm and 
legal employment markets are being restructured in a fashion that has 
led and will likely continue to lead to lower legal employment 
opportunities; structural changes are likely to result in lower salaries 
and more contingent lawyer workforces. As one sign, major U. S. law 
firms are “outsourcing” legal work to staff attorney law firms in 
lower-cost cities such as Wheeling, West Virginia and Dayton, Ohio; 
some outsourcing of routine legal work to foreign cities, especially in 
India, has been evident for years.
29
 While relatively few international 
lawyers seek or gain employment in the United States, several 
observable trends will likely result in a more globalized legal job 
market; these include bar admissions pressures, international General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiations, and other 
flattening trends in international legal education. In some instances, 
these will lead to decreased opportunities for U.S. lawyers, at least 
those who speak only English.
30
 
 
 28. See generally Matt Leichter, Who Knew Law Students Were Scamming the 
Government All Along?, AMLAWDAILY (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.americanlawyer.com/ 
PubArticleALD.jsp?id=1202576338628 (reviewing NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (NAF), 
SAFETY NET OR WINDFALL? EXAMINING THE CHANGES TO INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT FOR 
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS (2012), available at http://edmoney.newamerica.net/publications/ 
policy/safety_net_or_windfall). See generally Alina Mogilyanskaya, 3 For-Profit Institutions 
Lose Student-Aid Eligibility After Failing 90/10 Test Twice, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 27, 
2012), http://chronicle.com/article/3-Institutions-Lose/134696/?cid=at&utm_source=at&utm_ 
medium=en. And there is a small boomlet for using alternative measures for measuring 
efficacy, which raise many troubling issues, particularly the voodoo economics and poor data 
availability. See, e.g., Dan Berrett, All About the Money; What if Lawmakers and  
Students Used Starting Salaries to Evaluate Colleges and Their Programs?, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Sept. 18, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/All-About-the-Money/134422/. 
 29. See Catherine Rampell, At Well-Paying Law Firms, a Low-Paid Corner, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 24, 2011, at A1 (domestic outsourcing); John Markoff, Smarter Than You Think: Armies 
of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at A1 
(restructuring of legal work through technology).  
 30. Penn State law professor Laurel S. Terry is among the leading scholars on this 
complex subject, and I am in her debt for spelling out the likely effect that GATS negotiations 
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Congressional and Obama Administration efforts to tighten up the 
gainful employment/ability-to-benefit equation have largely been a 
function of undergraduate proprietary schools, but the increased 
scrutiny to employment issues, including institutional honesty and 
transparency, will extend to legal education overall, which could 
restrict some schools from participation in the federal scheme. Law 
schools have not been fully scrutinized on these issues until several 
highly publicized incidents of institutional dishonesty and deceit 
surfaced, causing accreditation and legal education authorities to 
tighten up their procedures and to adopt more legalized governance 
procedures and reporting requirements.
31 
Professor Tamanaha spells 
out the falsified reporting scandals in some detail, and notes that what 
is often even worse is what passes for legal or normative within the 
vague rules, such as the many incidents of schools gaming reporting 
systems, sometimes to get over on authorities and to toe the line of 
what is proper and honest practice in legal education—or outright 
manipulation of programs, such as the shoddy practices of using 
transfer students to avoid LSAT score issues and the even more 
 
will have in more easily allowing foreign lawyers to practice in the United States. A sampler of 
her recent articles includes: The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of 
Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189; The European 
Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 1 (2009); From GATS to APEC: The Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal Services, 43 
AKRON L. REV. 875 (2010); An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and the 
FATF’s 2008 Lawyer Guidance, 2010 J. PROF. L. 3; and Transnational Legal Practice: 2009 
Year-in-Review, 44 INT’L L. 563 (2010).  
 31. In the competitive world of comparative admissions statistics, both colleges and 
professional schools have been caught at and have conceded serious evidence of fraud and 
misreporting data. One reporter, after reviewing a number of recent cases, wryly noted, “In the 
Wild West of college admissions, there is no Data Sheriff.” Eric Hoover, Inflated SAT Scores 
Reveal ‘Elasticity of Admissions Data,’ CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 1, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/headcount/inflated-sat-scores-reveal-elasticity-of-admissions-data/ 
2957. See, e.g., Martha Neil, ABA Raps Villanova re Inaccurate Admission Data, Says Law 
School Must Post Censure Online, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 15, 2011, 2:23 PM), http://www.abajournal 
.com/news/article/abas_legal_ed_section_sanctions_villanova; Mark Hansen, U of Illinois Law 
School Is Publicly Censured by the ABA, Fined for Misreporting Admissions Data, A.B.A. J. 
(July 24, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/u_of_illinois_law_school_is 
_publicly_censured_for_misreporting_admissions_d/; John A. Byrne, Who Cooked The Books 
At Tulane?, POETSANDQUANTS (Jan. 17, 2013), http://poetsandquants.com/2013/01/17/who-
cooked-the-books-at-tulanes-b-school/. See generally William Seth Howard, The Student Loan 
Bubble and the Race to Princeton Law School, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 485 (2011) (conservative 
critique of law school financing policies); Gene R. Nichol, Wages, Work, Privilege, and Legal 
Education, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 401 (2011) (liberal critique of these issues). 
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questionable—although allowed at the time—practice of hiring 
recent law alums so as to make them appear to be genuinely 
employed, for placement purposes.
32
  
These are daunting developments in the world of legal education, 
and many of the evils in his list have occurred, knocking out or 
reducing the possibility of law school, especially for students from 
poor families, for first-generation college graduates, for immigrant 
families, and for minority communities.
33
 Because these communities 
are growing and will provide the applicants for future law 
classrooms, these developments are ominous and unforgiving, 
depending upon how one views the changes. While many people see 
some of these, and some see many of these, I believe that Professor 
Tamanaha’s book is a needed wakeup call. However, had his 
 
 32. Paul Campos, as one such critic, has accused law schools of misrepresenting 
graduation placement figures. Paul Campos, Served: How Law Schools Completely 
Misrepresent their Job Numbers, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/ 
87251/law-school-employment-harvard-yale-georgetown. See also Eric Kelderman, American 
Bar Association Takes Heat From Advisory Panel on Accreditation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(June 9, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/American-Bar-Association-Takes/127869/?key=SW 
glIgU5ZXVKZnlqZj0UYD0AbH1tNxh2YnhNPnotblxREw%3D%3D (ABA not in compliance 
with seventeen regulations, but accrediting status renewed). In 2012, the ABA Section of Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar censured both the University of Illinois and Villanova law 
schools for submitting falsified data, and also fined Illinois a quarter million dollars. See Karen 
Sloan, Illinois Law Fined $250,000 for Falsifying Applicants' Test Scores, NAT’L L.J. (July 24, 
2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202564243650&Illinois_Law_fined 
_250000_for_falsifying_applicants_test_scores. These transgressions have been widely 
reported by the trade press. See Karen Sloan, ABA Backs Off Making Law Schools Report 
Graduates’ Salaries, NAT’L. L.J. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleN 
LJ.jsp?id=1202546229913&ABA_backs_off_making_law_schools_report_graduates_salaries_ 
(new ABA accreditation standard on improving data reports); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, 
No Fudging: Revised Standard Bars Law Schools from Publishing Misleading Consumer Info, 
A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/no_fudging_revised_stand 
ard_bars_law_schools_from_publishing_misleadin/. For a decade-long bookends survey of 
ways in which many law schools fudge their data, see Jerome Organ, How Scholarship 
Programs Impact Students and the Culture of Law School, 61. J. LEGAL EDUC. 173, 190 (2001); 
see also Ben Trachtenberg, Law School Marketing and Legal Ethics, 91 NEBR. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013). Professor Trachtenberg’s careful and comprehensive review is a 
devastating indictment of law school misrepresentations, one that recommends professional 
responsibility and ethics disciplinary investigations for legal educators who engage in such 
behavior.  
 33. Recent developments in immigration policy and state bar association practices have 
even led to law graduates in unauthorized status being recommended for full bar membership in 
Florida and California. See Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 463, 535–38 (2012).  
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analyses been more comprehensive and his proposed remedies been 
more nuanced and less self-abnegating, the project would have been a 
useful irritant and a beacon, shining uncomfortable and disinfecting 
light on an important sector of postsecondary education. It might 
have even set out real reforms that could have been adopted and 
could have led to real change, rather than the cursing the darkness 
and blaming faculty evident in Failing Law Schools. 
PROFESSOR TAMANAHA’S FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS 
His architecture is largely an attack upon the fulltime faculty 
model of legal education, which he identifies as a combination of 
self-serving governance, faculty concupiscence, and law school 
greed, all of which combine to rob students of genuine choices and to 
require these duped students into subsidizing the expensive lifestyle 
preferences of law professors:  
Law schools are financially trapped by what they have 
become: top-heavy institutions with scholars teaching few 
classes (writing a lot) and clinicians teaching few students. The 
perpetual “more” of recent decades—creating more time for 
writing, hiring more scholars and more skills-training teachers, 
and spreading more money around—severely constrains law 
schools going forward 
 . . . . Harvard set a new definition of what it meant to be an 
elite school: “elite” law schools (and those striving for this 
status) expand their faculty as a conspicuous display of 
intellectual wealth. Elites stockpile scholarly talent. While 
Harvard has the financial heft to pull it off, most law schools 
do not. The need for revenue kicked in.
34
  
He writes to put the entire polity and legal education community on 
notice that we face significant challenges in all these areas, and not 
all law schools will be able to survive the end game of some of these 
events. One need only look at the housing bubble and credit market 
collapse to see how quickly and precipitously such problems can 
 
 34. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 67–68. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Ask Not for Whom the Law School Bell Tolls 119 
 
 
occur. Professor Tamanaha sees such a “fundamental change” not as 
a tragedy but as a necessary clarion call and market correction:  
To affect the overall dynamic of rising tuition and debt 
requires a more fundamental change. Previously, the federal 
government guaranteed student loans made by private lenders, 
but it now loans money directly to students. When lending the 
money, the government makes no evaluation of whether the 
borrower is likely to repay the loan. A student who borrows to 
attend Thomas Jefferson or Cooley gets the same treatment as 
a student who borrows to attend Harvard Law School, 
notwithstanding the fact that a far greater proposition of the 
former will not repay the loan. A private lender would soon go 
out of business if it operated this way, but in the student loan 
context this policy is justified as “providing access.”35  
Such a formulation not only would violate federal law, which does 
not allow differentiations based upon efficacy, or at least his version 
of efficacy, but this scenario completely misapprehends the way the 
financial aid and loan system actually works. The government had 
used a series of private lenders (such as The Access Group) to 
originate loans and to service them through the life of the transaction. 
By switching to direct lending, the government made a major policy 
shift to reduce the involvement of these vendors and loan servicers.
36
 
All student borrowers are required to “repay the loans” by one means 
or another, including income contingent means or public service, so 
the federal government’s institutional evaluation is neither required 
nor likely to improve the repayment. While some extreme hardship 
cases are exceptions, Congress has chosen not to allow most such 
loans to be discharged in bankruptcy. Oddly, Professor Tamanaha is 
critical of students’ inability to discharge these debts: “there must be 
no federal guarantee of private loans to attend law school, and any 
 
 35. Id. at 178 (emphasis added). 
 36. Michael Stratford, As Loan Servicers Multiply, So Do Problems for Students, College 
Officials Say, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 23, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/More-Loan 
ServicersMore/134564/?cid=at&utm_source=at&utm_medium=en. These developments have 
forced The Access Group, the major law school loan service, founded by the LSAC, to 
reconstitute itself, probably as a foundation, while its loan assets are working their way through 
the system. 
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such private loans must be eligible for bankruptcy. This would put 
the risk on lenders, which would not loan money to students who are 
unlikely to repay (at least not without charging prohibitive interest 
rates).”37  
Imagine what this world of legal education would look like, with 
probably no more than a dozen law schools, which he has already 
criticized as elite, in a position to serve as banks, with all the complex 
technical and legal regimes such lending authority would entail, and 
the required finances and capitalization.
38
 If I were a trustee of that 
institution or its general counsel, I would run away screaming rather 
than institute such a naïve and simplistic plan, especially one where 
the loans to my graduates could be more easily discharged in 
bankruptcy. Indeed, when there were issues of repayment for the 
private loans (not all students are eligible for federally subsidized 
loans, a point he does not seem to recognize), lenders began to use 
FICO scores, co-signers, and other mechanisms to guarantee 
eligibility and to screen clients.
39
 After all, most undergraduates and 
many law students are not credit-worthy in the traditional sense of 
having assets or collateral. Rather, most are all promise and 
possibility, underwater, with their earning potential not yet realized. 
But worse than simply not understanding the complexities of the 
financial loan system he proposes eliminating, I believe, and regret, 
that Professor Tamanaha lays most of these problems at the feet of 
faculty and their deans who give in and capitulate to their demanding 
and slacker law teachers, and then cavalierly duck the bill and pass it 
to duped students who do not know better. His narrative is littered 
with poor Sarahs and other students who are forced to pick up the 
tabs for indulged faculty. (Occasionally he is critical of deans, mostly 
by side bar references to those with inflated decanal perquisites and 
salaries, some of which are over half a million dollars, but he mostly 
 
 37. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 180. 
 38. To get an understanding of how much regulation would be triggered by his 
suggestion, see generally DEANNE LOONIN, STUDENT LOAN LAW (3d ed., 2009 Supp.) and the 
National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) companion website, http://www.consumerlaw.org/ 
webaccess (allowing subscriber access to site materials). 
 39. In some cases, this development has also detrimentally affected the financial credit 
situation for borrower parents. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Child’s Education, but Parents’ 
Crushing Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2012, at A1. 
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demonizes faculty for lining their own pockets with student money.) 
He scolds, “if the escalation in the price of a legal education is to be 
contained, law professors must take less and do more. Faculties must 
shrink. Raises must be tempered, though in an uneven way: the senior 
generation of professors—twenty-plus years out of law school—must 
accept less to allow our younger colleagues to have more.”40 In this 
sense, he also does not appear to understand the wage structure of 
public institutions or the nature of wage compression. In many 
institutions, junior faculty already make as much or more than do 
more senior colleagues who have stayed at the same institution for 
many years.
41 
I am also mystified by Professor Tamanaha’s curious eliding 
together of the ABA and the AALS, in several chapters other than 
Chapter Three. Except in this Chapter, where he accurately 
characterizes the differences between the two groups, he lumps them 
together throughout the rest of the book as gun shy (due to a major 
expensive antitrust lawsuit that has not been in effect for several 
years, and from which the AALS was removed as a defendant) and 
collusive in their insistence upon long-held standards and quality 
measures. As one of several confusing examples, he is critical that 
the ABA and AALS are joined at the hip:  
In effect, all accredited law schools are set up like research 
universities. Pursuant to the unified academic model promoted 
by AALS and enforced by the ABA, what might have 
developed as the law school equivalent of community colleges 
has been squashed, banished to the unaccredited realm, 
reducing the availability of low cost options for people who 
wish to become lawyers.
42
  
 
 40. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 187. 
 41. The best single resource for understanding salary issues, including compression, is 
found in the authoritative and accessible work of labor economist RONALD G. EHRENBERG, 
TUITION RISING: WHY COLLEGE COSTS SO MUCH 113–25 (2000). In this volume, he explains 
how salaries across seniority and fields of study can vary in institutions and in different regions. 
See also Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Hirschel Kasper & Daniel Rees, Faculty Turnover at American 
Colleges and Universities, 10 ECON. EDUC. RES. 99 (1991). 
 42. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 45. 
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He even misidentifies the AALS not as a voluntary membership 
organization but as an accreditor,
43 
but his narrative does not fairly 
record the unusual and unprecedented enmity that existed for a period 
where a small group of conservative law deans had captured the ABA 
Council and standards review process—even stubbornly insisting that 
the longstanding standards did not require tenure or the equivalent.
44
  
The accreditation process of the ABA deserves better than he 
allows, not in all its particulars, but as an overall safeguard of 
institutional quality and as a requirement by the federal government 
for financial aid eligibility purposes. But to suggest, as he does 
throughout, that the two organizations are linked together to protect 
faculty is simply risible. First, there are relatively few faculty 
involved in the ABA Council governance process, relative to deans, 
and many of the faculty once served as deans. That the process 
requires all two hundred law schools to be the same or to operate 
similarly is belied by his own narrative throughout, a narrative that 
reveals tremendous variability and diversity; there are dozens of law 
schools that could not or would choose not to join AALS, a voluntary 
organization. What I see as necessary and “selfless duty” he mocks as 
featherbedding and selfishness. His false premises, careless and 
incorrect insider baseball, and inconsistent railings at the process 
undermine what could have been a useful and substantive critique, 
rather than the hollow ring of an advantaged law professor, one 
simply protesting too much. 
DEAN MATASAR’S VERSION OF EVENTS 
I do not suggest for a moment that all legal educators have 
ignored these markers or that no one has tried to point out the 
problems. One of the more thoughtful observers is former New York 
 
 43. Id. at 177. 
 44. In the exchange that occurred in March 2011 at an ABA Council public forum, an 
ABA subcommittee chair who had put forward the proposals in effect called me a liar when I 
was critical of the proposals. My letter to the Subcommittee is posted at the AALS website: 
http://www.aals.org/advocacy/Olivas.pdf. See also Mark Hansen, ABA Committee Members 
Show No Inclination to Start Over on Accreditation Standards Review, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 2, 
2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_committee_members_show_no_inclination 
_to_start_over_on_accreditiation_s/. Rather than succumb to my lesser angels, I am reserving to 
another schoolyard the proper rebuttal to his ad hominem take. 
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Law School Dean Richard Matasar, who has pointed out many of 
these issues, and has done so in both scholarly fashion and through 
his service on the Board of The Access Group. His article in the Iowa 
Law Review, The Viability of the Law Degree: Cost, Value, and 
Intrinsic Worth, was an even more succinct indictment of the status 
quo, and he identified many of the rabbit trails that were explored by 
Professor Tamanaha.
45
 If Dean Matasar is right, and I suspect he is 
absolutely correct in his diagnosis of the problems, we all owe him a 
debt of gratitude—in this context, I mean debt in the literal sense. As 
I will note at the end, he and I strenuously disagree on what the 
conditions will require, so we do not read the problems as driving the 
same solutions, but I start with the premise that we all need to look at 
the developments, or they shall surely engulf us at high tide, and 
there will be no safe harbors. By the Matasar metrics, schools all 
across the spectrum will encounter serious problems, not just the 
more marginal schools that are part of our expansive universe. 
After detailing a number of the same developments that were later 
highlighted in Failing Law Schools, Dean Matasar notes,  
The simple answer is that the law degree will continue to be 
viable . . . for some. Law schools with ancient and powerful 
reputations will prosper over the short- to medium-term. The 
very few schools currently offering inexpensive degrees should 
survive, joined by newer, innovative, less costly programs that 
will emerge. For the remaining, expensive mid-tier schools, the 
degrees they offer will become less and less attractive, unless 
they seek to create value for their graduates commensurate 
with their costs.  
He also notes, and this may be the most important admonition he 
raises, “And for a large group of wanna-be lawyers, the degree will 
make sense only if they properly evaluate its cost, their expected 
financial returns, and most importantly, the intrinsic value of 
 
 45. Richard A. Matasar, The Viability of the Law Degree: Cost, Value, and Intrinsic 
Worth, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1579 (2011). He has a long record of scholarship in this area, including 
Richard A. Matasar, Does the Current Model of Legal Education Work for Law Schools, Law 
Firms (or Anyone Else)?, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 2010, at 20. 
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becoming a lawyer.”46 He also resorts to a clever (and devastating) 
characterization, one that will resonate for the politics of many legal 
educators: “If Robin Hood took from the rich and gave to the poor, 
law school often does the reverse. It gives scholarships to top 
students, who have employment opportunities at firms that pay top 
salaries, funded by full-paying, lower-ranked students, whose 
employment will often be at organizations paying more modest 
salaries.”47 I stand shoulder to shoulder next to him in this critique, 
and have dedicated my professional life to inculcating this view and 
trying to persuade all who will listen that “merit” has many metrics, 
not just how well one did on a Saturday morning in a large group, 
with a no. 2 pencil. I even served as a trustee of the College Board, so 
that I could better understand the SAT and its disproportionate role in 
the admissions process. (That service also allowed me the perspective 
of being on the short end of 16–1 votes more than once.) 
Even so, as I indicated, he and I fundamentally differ on our 
solutions or prescriptions for what we both agree is an ailing system. 
As my first form of disagreement, I do not think that the rise of more 
law schools has led or will ever lead to a better situation, even as it 
has made attendance more accessible and improved the job market 
for law professors and legal educators generally. I am particularly 
skeptical of the many proprietary law schools that have arisen, and I 
do not believe that every metropolitan statistical area or geographic 
nook and cranny necessitates a law school. At some point, the 
economics of establishing new law schools will shift, and the barriers 
to entry will increase, while existing schools, some of them 
improvidently established at high tide, will have to fold. Dean 
Matasar has successfully articulated a need to increase the number of 
contingent faculty as a cost-control measure. (His views have 
substantially affected deliberations on ABA security-of-position 
proposals, through the legerdemain of the American Law Deans 
Association.) In my belief system, this top-down managerial 
approach would compromise the entire system, rendering the cure 
worse than the ailment. Dean Matasar concludes that “law schools, 
law-school regulators, and the profession must be willing to 
 
 46. Matasar, The Viability of the Law Degree, supra note 45, at 1580. 
 47. Id. at 1581. 
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experiment and permit new models of legal education to arise that 
can produce sufficient value at a reasonable cost in order to assure the 
continued viability of the law degree.”48 I am not as sanguine, and 
believe that a number of these developments would lower the quality 
of instruction to a deplorable level, particularly if some of the tenure-
eliminating proposals making their way through the Council of the 
ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar process 
are adopted, and if more legal study is delivered by internet and 
distance education.
49
 There is already considerable flexibility built 
into the accreditation process that has resulted in many differences 
among law programs and experimental law schools. In my calculus, 
losing some lower-quality or inefficient law schools may be an 
acceptable price to retain the core faculty and traditional governance 
structures. Dean Matasar (and Professor Tamanaha) would disagree 
with me:  
Revising the current accreditation standards would almost 
certainly make it possible for new entrants to the legal 
education market—schools using higher levels of distance 
learning, with much smaller facilities; schools taught by part-
time, contingent faculty, paid at lower salaries; schools seeking 
to produce lawyers more quickly than two years; schools 
permitting work for pay; schools permitting credit for work 
that is paid by others; and so on. Such schools almost certainly 
would be lower cost than existing schools and might exert 
substantial pressure on those schools to change.
50
  
As I wrote in a column to AALS member readers, these indispensable 
features of legal education in the United States are like our 
democratic processes: worse than anything except the alternatives. 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. A useful website makes available the public submissions and much of the public work 
product of the Standards Review Committee (SRC), charged with reviewing the various 
accreditation Standards and recommending any changes to the ABA Section on Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar: http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/ 
committees/standards_review.html. I reviewed some of the problems that had arisen in this 
SRC process in my 2011 AALS Presidential Lecture, Academic Freedom and Academic Duty, 
in AALS NEWS, Mar. 2011, at 1, 2, 9, available at http://www.aals.org/documents/newsletter/ 
february2011.pdf [hereinafter Olivas, 2011 AALS Presidential Lecture]. 
 50. Matasar, The Viability of the Law Degree, supra note 45, at 1621. 
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Increasing the number and percentage of contingent and transitory 
faculty will diminish the overall quality of the enterprise, and should 
be resisted vigorously, rather than regressing to the churning mean of 
a part-time faculty, serving as independent contractors.
51
 As in any 
large debate over fundamental principles, those wishing to change a 
longstanding, well-articulated, successful, and robust status quo have 
the burden of persuasion, and as I have tried to demonstrate, these 
proposed remedies would harm the patient and have substantial 
collateral consequences. This said, a downsizing of legal enrollments 
and a slowdown in accrediting new law schools will most likely 
prevail, even with wrenching consequences for a number of law 
graduates and their schools. Some schools, especially lower quality 
and marginal proprietary institutions, may close, a rueful but not 
necessarily bad result. To effectuate these difficult decisions, more 
regulation should be exacted of the producer schools, including more 
difficult school entry standards and criteria, not a self-governing and 
laissez faire universe, especially if it remains largely subsidized by 
taxpayers.  
CONCLUSION 
That said, all of us similarly have a serious interest in cost 
containment and in making legal education accessible and affordable 
to our students. We cannot simply hope that the problems will resolve 
themselves. We have erected a substantial system of training lawyers, 
one that is a spectacular success by any measure, notwithstanding the 
cracks evident in the infrastructure. Faculty need to keep up with 
these developments, counter challenges to our existence, and work 
harder to explain why our system is worth saving at its core. We also 
need to do a better job of explaining the large role of lawyers in the 
world society, not only as technicians with attention to detail but as 
defenders of important core values and democratic principles. I do 
not view the migrating role of lawyers to civilian life across non-law 
fields as evidence of our declining competence, as some 
commentators have in analyzing legal employment figures, but rather 
as robust evidence of the growing value of being a lawyer and 
 
 51. Olivas, 2011 AALS Presidential Lecture, supra note 49, at 1. 
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applying our skills to the many societal problems in need of our 
multifaceted talents.
52
 This is not a feeble and reflexive defense of the 
status quo, and I share the concerns for our students and graduates, 
having spent all my professional life trying to serve them. It is no 
accident that a disproportionate number of lawyers serve in business 
enterprises, as well as in positions of governmental leadership and 
civic participation, giving generously of time and talent. Professor 
Tamanaha is properly concerned when some schools produce few 
graduates who go on to become or practice as lawyers (some as low 
as 26 percent),
53
 but I do not despair when I see these figures, 
provided they reflect a genuine choice of the graduates, not a choice 
forced on them by failure to navigate the bar processes, whether the 
examination portion or the moral character and fitness components of 
becoming lawyers. Any law school that rests on its laurels without a 
searching examination of its business model and its self-governance 
obligations or one that whistles past the graveyard during this 
difficult current situation does not deserve the resources we all 
collectively provide legal education. There can be no doubt that some 
shrinking of individual schools and the overall enterprise is in order, 
and more attention to stricter—not looser—entrance requirements for 
starting new schools, including much more detailed needs analysis 
for regional schools and expansionist ambitions, especially for those 
existing schools that wish to cross state borders for satellite and 
branch campuses. The seven-year re-accreditation requirement, with 
 
 52. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 146–54. For early policies tying resources to placement, 
see Dan Berrett, All About the Money; What if lawmakers and students used starting salaries to 
evaluate colleges and their programs?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 21, 2012, at A1; see also 
Paul Basken, Cost Savings Appear Elusive in Push for Faculty Productivity, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Oct. 8, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Pushing-Faculty/134892/?cid=at&utm_ 
source=at&utm_medium=en (noting difficulty in productivity practices and studies). Early in 
my own career, I encountered a field being restructured, and left the field of English before 
finishing my PhD because of my own difficult and searching assessment about employment 
prospects in college teaching in the mid-1970s. Many fields have had such restructuring and 
have had devastating prospects for participants. For a review of the cyclic nature of English 
teaching, see Kaustuv Basu, A Modest Bump, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 25, 2012, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/09/25/mla-list-shows-modest-increase-job-openings. I 
do believe this to be an under-theorized area of the legal enterprise, one where more faculty 
should be involved and where more scholarship is called for, especially in the context of the 
many developments outside the academy. But again, here, as in many of the issues raised in this 
debate, a more contingent faculty will pay less attention to these student needs, not more. 
 53. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 114–16. 
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many schools on chronic report-backs for failures to meet criteria, 
should be tightened, not subjected to less regulation. Schools that 
repeatedly fall short of program criteria should be placed on 
probation, and chronic-failure schools should be subject to more, and 
more meaningful scrutiny. A gentlemen’s agreement leads to 
virtually no school having its taxi medallion taken away. At the level 
of individual schools, more vigorous attention to the placement 
functions needs to be paid at most schools, not just for recent 
graduates but for alumni who find themselves in need of career 
services assistance when their own practices are harmed by the 
contraction of the legal employment system. Whether or not law 
schools accede to consumer regulation, developments in this area will 
affect legal education the way that they have in undergraduate 
education generally.
54
 And faculty productivity could be increased, in 
ways that better allocate research and teaching assignments, 
including class size, tools that have long been in the arsenal of 
administrators who usually make such assignments. It has been my 
experience through observation and through the accreditation process 
that many law schools do variegate their teaching loads, mixing them 
with research, administrative, and program development assignments. 
It is the rise in administrative and support personnel that is more 
readily apparent, not the domain of faculty. This is not an embrace of 
business as usual, but all of these small considerations will require 
the full attention and governance of a full-time and engaged faculty. 
No permanent or systemic change will occur within a contingent 
faculty, churning through as they seek better opportunities. No 
proposal to abrogate tenure or make the legal academy more 
“flexible” and less permanent has satisfactorily accounted for the 
huge transaction costs that would certainly be implemented when 
U.S. law schools adopt the Latin American model or other 
approaches away from the current model. The move to clinical 
faculty continuing year contracts and the substantial number of other 
contingent instructors has already begun, and needs no overhaul of 
 
 54. As good examples of this rising concern, see, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Student Versus 
University: The University’s Implied Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. 
REV. 183 (2000); Angela C. Lyons, A Profile of Financially At-Risk College Students, 38 J. 
CONS. AFF. 56 (2004). 
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the ABA Standards that would accelerate this trend. Indeed, I would 
reverse this trend if I were to effectuate many of the changes that 
critics are urging.
 
There is a fatalistic fin-de-siècle sense in Professor Tamanaha’s 
dire work, one that is inconsistent with the actual world in which 
most law professors and law schools find themselves, and it is these 
inconsistencies and contradictions that fatally undermine his vision. 
Whether in the collective sense or the more focused, single-law 
school sense, faculty do not make all these decisions that he rues. 
When my own institution revised its workload policy to have fewer 
overall courses taught by individual faculty members, the decision 
was largely that of the University of Houston Law Center 
administration, in consultation with the Faculty Executive Committee 
and several substantial discussions at several faculty meetings, where 
it was obvious that there would be clear tradeoffs—less flexibility or 
coverage in the overall curriculum for our students, fewer small 
seminars and “favorite” courses, and less play in the joints for leaves 
and semesters off. We have some faculty—but not as many as we 
used to have—who teach in a part-time, adjunct, or contingent 
fashion. We have increased clinics and clinical faculty, and a major 
commitment to skills training, as evidenced by both curricular and 
non-curricular resources. This decision-making is how most law 
faculties determine their own fates, with none of the featherbedding 
or greedy considerations suggested by Professor Tamanaha as the 
prerequisites. (It is in contrast to the way he apparently implemented 
such a top-down plan on his own in his short interim term as acting 
dean.)
55 
Just as the Yeshiva case misapprehended how normative 
academic decision-making is actually undertaken, as if the faculty 
were the drivers of all the institutional decisions, so they are really 
elided with management, and so cannot collectively bargain in 
 
 55. It also betrays ignorance for him to single out immigration or tax clinic practices as 
giving students “common tasks” to learn. I hereby invite Professor Tamanaha to visit our 
extraordinary University of Houston Law Center immigration law clinic, where highly 
specialized students handle dozens of high-wire cases each term, no two of which are alike or 
“common.” One of our important cases even went to the U.S. Supreme Court, overturning the 
Fifth Circuit in a unanimous decision. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) 
(minor drug offenses are not automatic grounds for deportation of permanent resident).  
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 so Professor Tamanaha resorts to anecdotal 
stereotypes of faculty self-interest and selfishness that do not ring 
true, and do not square with my own experiences of service on the 
ABA Council, the AALS Executive Committee, the Association’s 
Membership Review Committee, and eighteen site inspections. I have 
cursed my share of darkness, but I never really expected that such 
fist-shaking would convince others. Professor Tamanaha should have 
no such illusions either. 
Perhaps most importantly, we need to be supporters for legal 
education writ large, and also to be critics that hold it and ourselves 
to high standards. In many countries, law faculties are entirely part-
time and contingent, and widespread student access is limited by a 
filter of counterproductive and inefficient attrition. In schools such as 
these across the world, thousands of law students enter the chute, sit 
in desultory fashion in large classes for years of instruction, and 
never graduate or move into the legal profession. This is not the path 
we have chosen, and it is our glory. At the least, suggestions for 
improvement should demonstrably improve the situation before us. In 
my view, making law faculties more contingent and part-time, 
leaving them more subject to top-down decanal governance, and 
loosening further the minimal accreditation standards and federal 
government loan program requirements will do great harm to law 
schools and law school graduates. We should not belittle legal 
education’s accomplishments, just as we should not overlook its 
weaknesses or inefficiencies or inequities. The bell will toll for all of 
us, even if we do not always hear its loud peals. 
 
 56. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (holding faculty in 
mature universities are “managerial employees,” hence ineligible for collective bargaining). 
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